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INNOVATION - THE CASE FOR MULTI-LEVEL RESEARCH 
 
It is now generally recognised that we are in the midst of major economic upheaval, 
with the kind of ramifications not seen since the industrial revolution of the early 
nineteenth century.  Products of the human mind, such as software, pharmaceuticals 
and microprocessors, are replacing those of the earth and the blast furnace as our 
primary measure of economic power, and information technology is set to become the 
world's biggest industry within the next decade, displacing the automobile as the 
primary barometer of economic activity (Mandel 1997).  As a recent editorial in Forbes 
has pointed out, in an international economy built on new technologies that are free 
from many physical restraints change "goes into overdrive" (Forbes 1997, p.130).   
 
It is no surprise, then, that innovation is fast becoming the central preoccupation in 
management and related studies.  "Innovate or fall behind: the competitive imperative 
for virtually all businesses today is that simple", is how Leonard and Straus (1997, 
p.111) see it, and their view is widely shared (Peters 1990, Beck 1992).  Yet, in spite of 
this increasing attention, we still have much to learn about the process of innovation in 
organisational and institutional settings.  Questions such as why some firms are more 
innovative than others in the same industry, why some regions or countries are more 
innovative in certain industry sectors than others, and why innovation of the more 
radical kind most often tends to come from outside of existing industries are still being 
pursued with little resolution in sight.   
 
To date, most studies of innovation and its link with competitiveness have tended to 
focus on a single level of analysis.  Industrial economists, evolutionary economists and 
institutional theorists have all tended to focus on the nature of innovation at sectoral, 
regional/national or even global levels (Nelson 1992, Jacobson 1994, Niosi and Bellon 
1996), while management theorists have tended to focus on factors governing 
innovation at the level of the firm (Quinn 1985, Sinetar 1985, Drucker 1986, Kanter 
1988, Cohen and Levinthal 1990, Leavy 1997).  This paper argues that the time is now 
ripe for a move towards more multi-level, interdisciplinary research.  The early part of 
the paper reviews the literature on innovation and finds thematic and conceptual 
convergence across levels and disciplines around the relationship between innovative 
activity and institutional context and the nature of the innovation process itself.  This 
convergence, the paper concludes, indicates the opportunity for multi-level, 
interdisciplinary research and points the way towards the kind of framework based on 
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systems thinking, learning theory and dynamic analysis, through which such research 
might be pursued. 
 
THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT FOR INNOVATION 
Among the most prominent themes linking the literature on innovation across levels 
and disciplines is the growing interest in the relationship between institutional context 
and innovative activity.   
 
There is a strong tradition associating innovation primarily with rare entrepreneurial or 
inventive talent.  This tradition has its roots in the early literature on economic 
development, particularly with the Schumpeterian (1912) characterisation of the 
process as one of 'creative destruction'.  As Baumol (1958, p.64) pointed out nearly 
forty years ago, the entrepreneur is "at the same time one of the most intriguing and 
one of the most elusive characters in the cast that constitutes economic analysis".  
Attempts over the years since to pin down the definitive attributes of this elusive 
character have continued to meet with little success (see Burch 1986 for a typical 
example).   
 
There is no doubt that rare talent plays its part in innovation activity, often in the most 
dramatic ways.  History continues to demonstrate the impact that scientific and 
commercial genius can have on the growth of firms and the transformation of 
industries.  Chester Carlson of Xerox, Edwin Land of Polaroid and Bill Gates of 
Microsoft, are well-known cases in point.  Throughout the scientific community itself 
there are those like Howard Schneiderman (1991, p.55), the former vice-president of 
research and development at Monsanto, who remain convinced that "outstanding 
researchers are a rare breed" and that "most seminal discoveries are made by a 
handful of outstanding researchers".  However, many are sceptical about the critical 
role of rare talent in innovation, and about the existence of a distinct entrepreneurial 
personality.  According to Drucker (1986) innovation is essentially "organised, 
systematic, rational work" (p.40) in which "everyone who can face up to decision 
making can learn to be an entrepreneur and to behave entrepreneurially" (p.65).  
Furthermore, Collins and Porras (1996), in their recent study of companies that have 
survived and thrived for more than 40 years, have found that neither great ideas nor 
great and charismatic individual entrepreneurs were necessary in the building and 
sustaining of great enterprises. 
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While we can never discount the often dramatic role of rare talent in innovation, the 
indications from the literature, and from everyday empirical experience, are that such 
talent is not the definitive factor in any attempts to understand why some firms are 
consistently more innovative than others in the same sector, why some sectors are 
more innovative than others, or why innovative activity can vary so much across 
regions and countries.  The literature across levels and disciplines is increasingly 
interested in understanding the characteristics of the institutional context that affect 
innovative activity and can help to explain these firm, sectoral and regional variations. 
 
One of the central issues relating institutional context with innovative activity is the 
question of institutional form.  For example, is innovative capability related to the size of 
firms?  There is evidence that the upward trend in the average size of firms that had 
been an enduring feature of economic development since the industrial revolution 
(Galbraith 1956, Chandler 1977) has slowed down or even reversed itself since the 
1970s (Peters 1992, Acs 1996), calling into question the view that there are increasing 
returns to scale - internal to firms - that drive successful firms to increase in size.  
Focusing on technology and innovation in particular, Acs and Preston (1997 p.2.) posit 
the question: “Is the apparent resurgence of smaller firms due to the emergence of a 
dynamic, vital innovative entrepreneurial sector, or is it due to the inability of large 
incumbent MNEs [multinational enterprises] to prevail in a technologically dynamic 
global environment?” 
 
There is some evidence that small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are better 
innovators than their larger counterparts.  This is suggested, for example, by the US 
data associated with Federal research funding which indicates that SMEs spend less 
on R&D than large firms, yet generate more new knowledge (Acs and Preston 1997).  
How can this be explained? 
 
The research to date clearly indicates that the internal institutional context is an 
important variable.  Researchers trying to understand why, often tend to start with a 
closer look at the more salient characteristics of the innovation process itself (Quinn 
1979, Quinn 1985, Kanter 1988, Peters 1990).  Most now agree that the process, in 
whatever organisational context, large or small, is essentially a probabilistic one, that 
even when well managed can best be described as one of "controlled chaos" (Quinn 
1985).  As Peters (1990, p.17) put it, "innovation, in the end and no matter how well 
thought out is a numbers game".  It requires variety in idea generation, and multiple 
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independent approaches help to improve substantially the odds for success.  It further 
requires a high degree of personal or group obsession to see the innovation safely 
through the initial period of high risk, high frustration and modest reward, since few 
begin as obvious commercial winners, even such classics as xerography.  Successful 
innovation also seems to require a fair degree of personal and financial slack, the 
closest possible link between marketplace and technology, and a context that can 
tolerate and learn from failure (Quinn 1985, Kanter 1988, Peters 1990).  Finally, it 
requires a context that values diversity, generates a marketplace for ideas and 
harnesses 'creative conflict' (Eisenhardt et al 1997, Leonard and Straus 1997).    
 
Few large firms have found it easy to institutionalise such a process within traditional 
organisational contexts, and many entrepreneurial firms seem to lose their capacity for 
innovation as they grow and develop into more formal organisations over time.  Quinn 
(1985) identified a number of very significant barriers including top management 
conservatism and isolation from the innovation process, intolerance for fanatics and 
'non-conformist' talent, short time horizons for expected payback, excessive 
rationalisation and routinization of the process, excessive bureaucracy and 
inappropriate rewards.  More generally, the traditional organisation has found it difficult 
to accommodate the more creative and non-conformist types who like to immerse 
themselves in technical challenges, often for the sheer intellectual pleasure of the 
chase, and whose preferred working habits tend to "contradict organizational 
expectations and mores" (Sinetar 1985, p58).  Larger organisations are often poorer 
protectors of the property rights of innovators, where the gains from innovation are 
more diffusely distributed (Acs et al 1997), and the reward and control systems in the 
larger organisation are too often designed to minimise surprise, yet in the innovation 
process "surprises are the name of the game" (Schneiderman 1991, p.54).   
 
However, some large firms have been able to rise to the challenge better than most, 
and have earned well-deserved reputations for innovativeness that have been 
enhanced over time.  They have done this mainly by trying to recreate many of the 
salient characteristics of the SME within a larger organisation context.  Take the 
example of 3M, which is increasingly being used as the benchmark by many 
established firms hoping to revitalise their capacity for corporate entrepreneurship.  
Among the most prominent features of the 3M approach is the explicit strategic 
commitment to competing on innovation, institutionalised in the company's ongoing 
formal aim that at least 25% of its sales should come from products introduced within 
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the most recent five-year period.  Furthermore, 3M has developed a corporate culture 
that celebrates as heroes those enterprising individuals whose persistence and 
commitment have triumphed over management indifference or bureaucratic rejection.  
The company's '11th Commandment' is 'Thou shalt not kill a new product idea'.  Its 
internal institutional context encourages experimentation and accepts failure as a 
productive stage on the road to success.  It also creates structures (like the Technical 
Senate and the Annual Technology Fair) that facilitate grass roots scientific 
communication across horizontal and vertical organisational boundaries (Bartlett 1995).   
  
Differences in internal institutional context alone will only go part of the way towards 
explaining why SMEs are often better innovators than their larger counterparts.  There 
is also evidence to suggest that SMEs tend to be more actively and extensively 
networked into their locality/region, with implications for innovative capability.  Evidence 
for this is provided by Almeida and Kogut (1997).  Focusing on patents in the 
semiconductor industry in the US, they show that small-firm start-ups "are unusually 
oriented toward the exploration of diversity by targeting less crowded technological 
fields", and that the exploration of small firms "has a strong local character: they are 
more sensitive to, and contribute more to, the innovations of spatially-contiguous firms" 
(p.24.).  This greater diversity among small, start-up firms is related to their 
'embeddedness' (Grabher 1993) in localities.  Proximity facilitates contacts between 
individuals that evolve into social and professional networks; these networks develop 
the common stock of knowledge in the locality that becomes the foundation for further 
innovation by starts; this is more beneficial to SMEs because the people in these firms 
are more likely to have had recent experience in other firms and therefore better links 
to other firms than personnel in large firms, which tend to be more vertically integrated 
and self-sufficient (Almeida and Kogut 1997).  This seems to be reflected in the 
findings of Saxenian's (1994) ethnographic study in which she notes that there is more 
inter-firm knowledge exchange in Silicon Valley than in the Route 128 region around 
Boston; the former has a higher share of starts while the latter is dominated by larger 
firms that inter-relate much less either with surrounding institutions or other firms in the 
region.  This difference is believed to be part of the reason why Silicon Valley remains 
vibrant while the Route 128 region has experienced a recent decline. 
 
There is counter-argument and counter-evidence, to the effect that MNEs continue to 
dominate the global economy (e.g.  Strange 1991, Amin 1993, Harrison 1994).  Much 
of the research showing the advantages of SMEs is location and/or sector specific.  
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Rothwell and Dodgson (1994, p.310), editors of the Handbook of Industrial Innovation, 
argue that “the role played in innovation by...  SMEs is strongly sectorally influenced;  
...the relative innovatory roles of large and small firms can vary over the industry 
lifecycle; and...  dynamic complementarities frequently exist between the technological 
change activities of large and small firms.”   
 
This is a warning against generalising in the debate on the relative advantages of large 
and small firms.  At a level of analysis above this debate, some generalisation is 
however possible:  for both large and small firms the influence of the institutional 
context on innovative activity is played out on a canvas that stretches well beyond the 
internal culture, structure and processes of the individual firm.  As Andréosso-
O'Callaghan and Jacobson (1997, p.6) have recently put it:  
 
 the decisions, strategies and actions of any firm evolve in a specific, regional or 
national, technological context, affected by a whole range of private and public 
institutions, and by the relationship between those institutions and firms, in 
short by a geographically and historically specific innovation system. 
 
While the systems of innovation research is still in its relative infancy, and the literature 
remains underdeveloped, clear strides have been made in establishing the link 
between wider contextual and institutional factors and firm-level innovation and in 
identifying the kinds of variables involved.  While the question as to which domain, 
local, regional, national, global or sectoral, is the most salient may itself vary with 
context, there is little doubt that such wider systemic influences are important.  For 
example, the financial, technical training and education, and industrial relations sub-
systems, seem to be important variables in distinguishing the effectiveness of the 
national systems of innovation in large countries (Andréosso-O'Callaghan and 
Jacobson 1997).  At the regional level, key variables include socio-cultural links such 
as common religion, artisanal training, party political membership, and strong sense of 
local community (Malerba 1993).  Furthermore, in industrial districts like Silicon Valley, 
regional and sectoral influences have been found to interact to produce new structural 
arrangements within and between firms that affect the system of innovation not only 
within individual firms but more reflexively throughout the region and sector (Saxenian 
1991, Bahrami 1992). 
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THE INNOVATION PROCESS - INVENTION, ABSORPTION AND INTEGRATION 
A second major theme linking the literature across different levels and disciplines is the 
growing recognition that invention is only one aspect of innovation, and often not the 
most significant aspect.  Innovation also involves processes of absorption and 
integration.   
 
The tradition in western management and economics has been to associate innovation 
primarily with technological development, and in particular with frame-breaking 
technological change.  When such breakthroughs happen they are often spectacular in 
their effects at firm, industry and national levels, as the histories of inventions like 
xerography, polymers and solid state electronics can attest.  However, such 
discontinuities are relatively rare, the main benefits that flow from them do not always 
go to the inventing firms and their economic regions, and technological change is not 
the only or even the most significant form of innovation in many cases.   
 
To date, the pattern of technological development in most industries has been one of 
long periods of evolution punctuated by rare episodes of radical change.  Tushman 
and Anderson (1986), for example, found a total of just eight discontinuous changes 
over the combined 190-year histories of the US cement, airline and minicomputer 
industries up to the early 1980s.  There was just one such change in the 200-year 
history of the Irish distilling industry (Leavy and Wilson 1994).  When such radical 
changes have occurred, the major economic rewards have not always gone to the 
inventors.  EMI in scanners, De Havilland in jet aircraft, and Xerox in personal 
computers are among the classic examples of inventive firms that failed to reap the 
lion's share of the economic rewards flowing from their technological breakthroughs.  
In many industries the technological protection regime is often quite weak, and many 
patents can be invented around quite easily (Teece 1986).  Studies by economists like 
Mansfield (1984) have shown that nearly two thirds of all patented innovations are 
imitated legally within four years of their introduction.  Resourceful imitators can often 
have their own versions of the technology on the market before an industry standard or 
dominant design has emerged.  Such imitators are often better at commercialising 
technologies than the originators, because they have complementary assets, like an 
established brand name or distribution system, that prove crucial to bringing the 
technology to the widest possible market, and they are also better at turning the new 
technology into products with much greater market-appeal.  Even in industries where 
the technological protection regime is quite strong, patient second movers, with better 
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applications skills and a greater commitment to developing the technology, can 
eventually match or even outperform the originator in reaping the commercial rewards.  
Canon's success in the copier industry pioneered by Xerox and Microsoft’s in GUI 
(graphic user interface) software pioneered by Apple are just two of many such 
examples. 
   
Once a new technology appears on the market the dynamics of technological 
development and the commercial rules of the game change at industry level (Utterback 
and Abernathy 1975, Utterback 1994).  Speed to the market with product 
enhancement and process innovations to make the manufacturing system more 
flexible and efficient become the competitive imperatives.  Proficiency in these areas 
depends more on development engineering capability and organisational factors than 
on rare scientific or technical insights.  The success of many Japanese companies in 
securing market leadership and the technological initiative in industries like video 
recorders, photocopiers, quartz timepieces and dynamic random access memory 
(DRAM) microchips, that were originally founded on western invention, was based on 
what we are now coming to recognise as a capacity for 'creative imitation' (Drucker 
1985; Rosenberg and Steinmueller 1988; Bolton 1993; Kim 1997).   
 
The success of creative imitators such as Matsushita has helped to direct renewed 
attention in the West towards long neglected elements of the innovative process, and 
their links with competitiveness (see Berger et al 1989).  As Rosenberg and 
Steinmueller (1988) have pointed out, western thinking about the innovation process 
has tended to focus excessively on the activities of the upstream inventor at the 
expense of the downstream engineer.  This tendency has been underpinned by a 
commercial culture that has "historically cast entrepreneurs and mavericks as virtual 
folk heroes" (Bolton 1993, p30), and undervalued the role played by teamwork and the 
cumulative power of numerous ideas for incremental improvement which have so often 
proved the decisive advantage of the successful imitator (Reich 1987, Kanter 1988).   
 
Creative imitation is an active learning process, backed up by well developed systems 
and processes for exploiting externally-developed knowledge (Bolton 1993).  Cohen 
and Levinthal (1990, p131) refer to an organisation's ability to innovate through the 
acquisition and exploitation of new knowledge as its 'absorptive capacity'.  The deeper 
and more diverse a firm's pre-existing knowledge structure, the greater is its absorptive 
capacity.  In addition, superior absorptive capacity is a potentially difficult to imitate 
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source of competitiveness because of its firm-specific and cumulative nature, and it 
can be continually enhanced as a by-product of the firm's research and development 
and other knowledge-gathering activities.  Creative imitation and absorptive capacity 
are inherently connected with an emphasis on development rather than invention, and 
"a central theme in the study of the development process has been its integrated, 
interactive, and iterative nature" (Rosenberg and Steinmueller 1988, p231).  As Hamel 
and Prahalad (1994) have recently stressed, absorption and integration are just as 
central to successful innovation as invention and often the more decisive processes in 
industries with fairly stable underlying technological orders.   
 
The growing recognition that innovation involves absorption and integration as well as 
invention has implications for our understanding of systems of innovation at all levels.  
We have seen earlier how prevailing mindsets and ideologies in different cultures lead 
to different levels of emphasis on inventive versus absorptive capacity at all levels from 
national economy to the individual firm (Kaplan 1987, Reich 1987, Rosenberg and 
Steinmueller 1988, Bolton 1993).  Innovation patterns are also affected by the 
underlying technology regimes governing industry evolution, with implications for 
whether technological changes are more likely to appear from existing players or from 
new entrants.  Malerba and Orsenigo (1997, p.84) have distinguished among two main 
patterns of innovation, 'creative destruction' and 'creative accumulation'.  The first is a 
'widening' pattern of innovation at sector level that is related to an innovation base 
which is "continuously growing through the entry of new innovators and to the erosion 
of the competitive and technological advantages of the established firms" (p.86).  The 
second is a 'deepening' pattern that is related to "the dominance of a few firms which 
are continuously innovative through the accumulation over time of technological and 
innovative capabilities" (p.86).  Others have referred to these two patterns of innovation 
as 'competency destroying' and 'competency enhancing' (Abernathy and Clark 1985, 
Tushman and Anderson 1990).  Competency enhancing innovations are embedded in 
the technologies that they replace, like the turbofan advance in jet engines.  They tend 
to emanate from the existing technological regime, and can propel industry evolution 
onto a new plane of development without any major disturbance to its existing 
structure.   
 
According to Malerba and Orsenigo (1997), the competency-enhancing pattern of 
innovation is more likely to be found in the newer sectors of the economy like 
chemicals and electronics.  The history of Raychem, one of the most consistently 
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innovative companies in the chemical sector supports this view.  As Paul Cook, the 
company's founder and long-time chief executive explained to William Taylor of the 
Harvard Business Review some years ago (Taylor 1990, pp.98-9):  
 
 Too many people still think innovation is about one brilliant technologist coming 
up with one breakthrough idea.  It's not.  When we started Raychem, we began 
to learn what radiation chemistry could do.  Within three or four years, we had 
generated virtually every idea behind the products that we are selling today 
(over thirty years on), and we are still working on that original inventory of 
ideas. 
 
Likewise, the leading companies in the semiconductor sector, like Intel, continue to see 
the technological trajectory over the next decade and beyond as very predictable, and 
the search for ever wider applications as the primary imperative in sustaining industry 
growth (Kirkpatrick 1997).  Such findings and examples lend credence to belief of 
commentators like Reich (1987) that the collective capacity of organisations to push a 
basic technology in new directions, continuously refining it into a stream of new 
products, which can in turn spawn further competency-enhancing technological 
trajectories, is becoming more and more the primary engine of wealth creation in the 
modern economy.   
 
The emphasis on systems and processes associated with the interest in creative 
imitation, absorptive capacity and cumulative change has highlighted the need to see 
innovation in much wider terms than that involving physical technology alone.  As the 
recent study by Markides (1997) has shown, many other aspects of business 
management, including novel approaches to marketing and logistics, have been just as 
radical in their effects on industry evolution as technological discontinuities.  In this, he 
provides ample support for the conclusion drawn by Abernathy and Clark (1985, p7) 
from their analysis of Timex's entry into the watch industry that "novelty and scientific 
advance may have little to do with an innovation's competitive significance".  
Innovations in organisation and management can be just as significant, as the MIT 
study of the world automobile industry has demonstrated (Womack et al 1990).  In fact 
the rise of the new industrial powers like Japan, contrasts with the earlier experience of 
countries like Great Britain, Germany and the United States in being based primarily on 
management innovation rather than technological innovation in the more traditional 
sense (Drucker 1988, Stata 1989).   
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The emphasis on absorptive capacity and collective entrepreneurship has also focused 
attention directly onto the importance of institutional learning processes in competing 
on innovation.  Stata (1989, p.64) is not alone in his view that "the rate at which 
individuals and organisations learn may become the only source of sustainable 
competitive advantage".  Absorptive capacity, with its emphasis on the importance of 
externally-generated knowledge also broadens our perspective on innovation from the 
traditional focus on intra-organisational processes to inter-organisational relationships.  
As such it raises interesting questions about institutional learning processes not only at 
organisational level, but also at sector and regional levels as well, and how such 
learning processes are stimulated or inhibited by competitive and collaborative 
relationships among firms.    
 
Traditionally, in the economics field, research on the diffusion of innovation and 
learning throughout industries and sectors has tended to focus on measuring rates of 
adoption of innovation and how they change over time (Mansfield et al, 1977).  
However, new approaches have emerged in more recent years, with evolutionary, 
path-dependency and industrial districts theorists all emphasising different factors in 
the diffusion process (see Lissoni and Metcalfe 1994, for a review of these 
developments).  Many economists are coming to recognise that any single theoretical 
approach will only explain part of the picture.  As Jacobson and Andréosso-
O’Callaghan (1996, p.176) have recently argued, "human, social and even cultural 
factors are increasingly being accepted as important in technology, innovation and 
diffusion", and innovation economists are being drawn beyond the traditional 
boundaries of their own discipline in the search for fresh insight. 
 
TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK FOR MULTI-LEVEL, INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH 
The thematic convergence across levels and disciplines reflected in the foregoing 
review points us towards the kind of framework within which multi-level, interdisciplinary 
research on innovation might be usefully developed, based on systems thinking, 
learning theory and dynamic analysis. 
 
The first conclusion that we can draw from the foregoing review is that the innovation 
process can no longer be fully understood at any single level of analysis.  This is 
perhaps most dramatically illustrated in the developing literature on systems of 
innovation, where very clearly the nature of innovative activity at firm level is seen to be 
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inextricably linked to institutional influences operating at national and sectoral levels.  
Increasingly, we consider firms in less discrete and atomistic terms in the context of 
industrial agglomerations like clusters, districts and filieres, with innovation emerging 
through supplier partnerships, strategic alliances and other forms of inter-organisation 
relationships (Jacobson and Andréosso-O’Callaghan 1996, pp.116-122).  In short, the 
study of innovation increasingly requires a systems perspective. 
 
A Living Systems Perspective 
What kind of systems perspective? Much of our traditional thinking about social 
systems at all levels of analysis is heavily influenced by mechanistic models.  As 
Morgan (1986, p.22) has observed "the mechanistic mode of thought has shaped our 
conception of what organisation is all about".  However, from what we know of the 
nature of the innovation process in its wider institutional context, the machine model 
seems increasingly inappropriate as a descriptive or explanatory framework.  Indeed, 
one of the central findings in the literature on innovation so far is that the process tends 
to be inhibited in organisations structured and managed along mechanistic lines.  
When it does work in such organisations, it is often more in spite of the institutional 
context than because of it (Quinn 1985, Kanter 1988).  The machine model is a 
command and control model.  It is a good model for portraying and understanding 
institutions as control systems, where the reliable repetition of well-defined activities is 
the predominant objective.  However, the innovation process in institutional settings 
does not fit easily into such a model. 
 
Increasingly, we are seeing the potential in more organic models or biological 
metaphors.  The tradition of using  organic analogies for the innovation process in 
organisational analysis goes back to the seminal study of Burns and Stalker (1961).  
Since then the concept of the organisation as a living system has been receiving 
increasing attention (Morgan 1986, de Geus 1997).  The organic model has a number 
of features which make it a more appropriate analogue for systems of innovation than 
the machine model.  In organic systems the relationship between the system and its 
component parts is more loosely coupled than that represented in the machine model, 
and system coherence is achieved through mutual adjustment not master-slave 
mechanical transmission.  The components of an organic system are seen as 
systems-within-systems with some scope for self-directed or autonomous action.  The 
boundaries separating the system from its super-system and sub-systems are flexible 
and permeable.  The relationship between cause and effect is often non-linear, and 
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initiatives taken in any part of the system can often ramify in ways that are 
unpredictable at the outset.  Feedback can be positive as well as negative, as ideas 
and innovations gather momentum and support.  In an organic perspective leaders are 
integral elements of the system, not controlling forces that operate on it from the 
outside.  The capacity for leadership is seen to be widely dispersed.  Its exercise is 
always an intervention in an energy system, where energy is "a property of the 
system", not the leader (Bate 1996, p33).  This is consistent with what we observe in 
the most innovative settings where leaders are seen to induce innovation rather than 
command it, and to do this through attention to institutional culture and context rather 
than through attempting to define with precision specific ends and means.  Bartlett's 
(1995, p1) description of 3M as "a kind of corporate petri dish that fosters a culture of 
innovation" reflects this organic perspective, as does Kanter's (1988, 205) description 
of innovation in institutional and organisational contexts as the process of "making a 
thousand flowers bloom".   
 
An organic systems metaphor also invites us to consider the application of an 
ecological perspective to innovation processes, which in itself can provide a very 
powerful tool for multi-level analysis.  The prerequisite for the application of such a 
perspective is the existence of relevant population dynamics (birth-death-rebirth rates).  
One of the realities that such a perspective makes us face is that the processes of 
innovation and economic development at all levels, will always involve some such 
dynamics (Schumpeter 1912, Bower and Christensen 1995, Nelson 1995).  However, 
the population dynamics relevant to innovation are not confined only to structures.  
Researchers like Burgleman (1991) have shown how the ecological perspective can 
also be applied in insightful ways to the process of technology selection, development 
and renewal within companies like Intel.   
 
In short, the organic systems model seems to offer an empirically valid and 
conceptually sound framework through which to study innovation from a multi-level, 
cross-disciplinary perspective.   
 
Learning Theory 
It is also clear from the foregoing review that the concept of learning, in institutional and 
organisational settings, lies at the heart of all innovation systems.  We saw this, for 
example, in the growing recognition that the absorption, integration and application of 
knowledge are just as essential to successful innovation in institutional contexts as is 
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its creation.  Innovation depends as much on the ability to create, mobilise and further 
develop system-wide learning structures, processes and communities as it does on 
inventive genius.  In industries with evolutionary technological trajectories, the capacity 
for institutional learning may be the key variable.   
 
Placing the concept of learning at the heart of a framework for the multi-level study of 
innovation offers a number of attractions.  To begin, with learning theory provides a 
conceptual basis for explaining the diverse and increasingly complex patterns of co-
operation and competition that are now emerging at both sector and firm levels.  At 
inter-organisational level we are seeing the growth of supplier-partnerships, strategic 
alliances and technology sharing.  Such co-operative strategies allow individual firms to 
develop deeper, more specialised learning structures and to pool competencies across 
organisational boundaries in the innovation process (Hamel 1991, Dyer and Ouchi 
1993, Quinn and Hilmer 1994).  At firm level increasingly we are seeing companies like 
ABB, General Electric and IBM, decentralise into federations in an attempt to generate 
more vibrant learning communities than was possible under more tightly-integrated 
monolithic structures.  Once again this combines a complex and subtle combination of 
competition and co-operation, competition in the generation of ideas and co-operation 
in their diffusion and application.   
 
Learning theory can also help us to understand at least in part why innovation systems 
follow certain patterns of development over time.  Many theorists point out that learning 
in institutional settings is itself a multi-level process.  The many distinctions to be found 
in the literature between single-loop and double-loop learning (Argyris and Schon 
1978), adaptive and generative learning (Senge 1990), higher and lower level learning 
(Fiol and Lyles 1985) and first-order and second-order learning (Levinthal and March 
1993) may differ somewhat in emphasis, but they all converge around the recognition 
that the learning processes that foster efficiency in social systems are not the same as 
those that foster change.  As Pascale (1991, p235) puts it, 'little' learning "maximizes", 
whereas 'big' learning "meta-mizes", and it is important for innovative systems to do 
both.  However, experience-to-date would seem to confirm that most social systems 
find it difficult to achieve the appropriate balance in their learning processes between 
the exploitation of existing knowledge and the exploration for new knowledge that are 
essential to their long run stability and survival (March 1991).   
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This insight into the different levels of learning goes some way towards explaining why 
radical innovation often happens outside of existing industries and their leading 
incumbents (Bolton 1993), why those radical innovators that "ride an innovation to the 
heights of industrial leadership often fail to shift to newer technologies" (Utterback 
1994, p162), and why industrial leadership "changes hands in about seven out of ten 
cases when discontinuities strike" (Foster 1986, p116).  Established industries and 
their leading incumbents often progressively get locked in to lower-level learning 
processes in the exploitation of their existing competencies so that they become 
incapable of fundamental technological renewal and blind to its commercial potential 
(Gilad 1994, Utterback 1994).  It is important, then, to be aware that the learning 
processes associated with innovation have potential downsides.  As Levitt and March 
(1988, p.335) have pointed out, "learning does not always lead to intelligent behaviour" 
and the same processes that yield experiential wisdom in organisations and wider 
social systems "also produce superstitious learning, competency traps, and erroneous 
inferences".  Furthermore, the levels of learning distinction draws needed attention to 
the political nature of innovation.  Lower-level learning that incrementally refines and 
finesses an existing technological regime tends to lead to the increasing sedimentation 
of an established power structure and its dominance over an existing organisational 
paradigm or institutional world view (Johnson 1988, Pascale 1991).  As a result, higher 
order learning rarely takes place without political action, and nearly always has political 
consequences (Hardy 1996, Hardy and Dougherty 1997). 
 
A learning perspective also tends to draw our attention to other key aspects of 
innovation in institutional settings.  In industries where creative absorption and 
integration are more important than pure invention, the competitive performance of any 
innovation system can be seen to turn on factors like the ability to accelerate 
institutional learning, appropriate learning opportunities, create vibrant learning 
communities and manage the interplay between tacit and explicit knowledge.   
 
We know from the literature on corporate transformation and renewal that learning can 
be accelerated by crisis, and higher-level learning often seems impossible without it 
(Starbuck et al 1978, Kanter 1983, Child and Smith 1987, Pascale 1991).  The more 
interesting question is if learning can be accelerated in a deliberate way in more 
favourable circumstances.  Senge (1993) suggests that institutions can create 
aspirational crises, with similar effects.  One way is to deliberately commit the 
institution to goals that stretch its resources and challenge its resourcefulness (Nonaka 
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1991, Hamel and Prahalad 1993).  Canon's plunge into the office products business, 
Turner Broadcasting's foray into 24-hour television newscasting, and Virgin's entry into 
the airline business are classic examples at firm level.  Kennedy's 'man-on-the-moon 
within a decade' space programme, and Korea's rapid rise to global industrial power 
are further examples at the more macro level.   
 
A focus on learning also extends our insight into how technological leadership can be 
established and secured beyond patent protection.  Patents protect existing 
knowledge.  Appropriating learning opportunities protects the underlying capability that 
produced this knowledge in the first place.  As Hamel and Prahalad (1994) have 
acutely observed, when a company like Canon supplies printer technology to its rivals, 
it is in effect borrowing their market share to accelerate its own learning and extend its 
hegemony over the technology's future migration.  The learning perspective also helps 
us in extending our thinking about innovation beyond the traditional confines of 
research and development activity.  As Brown (1991, p103) has pointed out, 
spontaneous innovation is happening all the time in diverse locations throughout most 
institutions, "wherever employees confront problems, deal with unforeseen 
contingencies, or work their way around breakdowns in normal procedures".  The 
ability to convert such local insight into institutional learning is often the key to 
competing on innovation at all levels of the social system.  According to de Geus 
(1997), working within a living systems perspective, this ability hinges on whether the 
institutional context encourages flocking or territorial behaviour.  "Birds that flock learn 
faster, so do organisations that encourage flocking behaviour" (p57).  It also hinges on 
the ability to manage the interplay between explicit and tacit knowledge in the 
innovation process (Nonaka 1991).  The most proprietary elements in any institution's 
underlying innovation capability are often rooted in shared tacit knowledge and the 
"many detailed understandings" that are "intuitively developed in countless 
conversations", as Ravi Venkatesan (1992, p.99) of Cummins Engineering has 
observed.  The quality of this interplay and the effectiveness of the flocking behaviour 
which is essential to it, may depend in turn on the degree to which the process of 
institutional learning has been underpinned by shared values, ideals and community 
spirit (Nonaka 1991, Kofman and Senge 1993).   
 
Many of these insights find ready resonance in the economics literature, where 
Lundvall (1992) and others are actively attempting to merge the evolutionary, systems 
of innovation and learning perspectives into a more unified 'theory of innovation and 
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interactive learning'.  Among their arguments is that advanced by Johnson (1992, p34) 
who suggests that innovations “are rooted both in the production structure and the 
institutional set-up of the economy”.  They see learning and innovation as interactive, 
both emanating to some extent from routine activities in economic production.  For 
them, different "technological opportunities, income elasticities and linkages between 
industries" can make learning in some industries and periods "much easier" than in 
others, and they view the innovation process as having "deep roots in the history of the 
economy".  This does not mean that it is not amenable to better understanding by 
research, nor to improvement by policy.  In fact, Johnson (1992, p.43) has argued for 
comparative studies of national systems of innovation as “a way to facilitate institutional 
learning and clarify the possibilities of institutional borrowing between countries”, 
providing a direct link with management theorists like Nonaka (1991). 
 
Dynamic Analysis 
The multi-level study of innovation, that adopts a living systems perspective and places 
the multi-level exploration of learning processes at the heart of the inquiry, will be 
concerned with change and require a dynamic mode of analysis.   
 
The power of dynamic analysis within a systems perspective can perhaps be best 
illustrated with a brief reference to one of the few multi-level, interdisciplinary studies of 
innovation to have been carried out to date, Linsu Kim's (1997) analysis of the process 
of technological learning in the Korean economy.  Korea's transformation from a 
subsistence agricultural economy to a global industrial power in less than four decades 
is unique in commercial history.  Korea is now a leading player in the automobile, 
consumer electronics and semiconductor industries.  The country made this 
transformation through a process of accelerated technological learning that spanned 
national, sectoral and firm levels of the social structure.  As Kim (1997, p194) 
summarised it: 
 
 The diverse factors that interacted complexly to influence the direction and 
speed of technological learning in Korean industries are government, chaebols, 
education, export policy, technology transfer strategy, research, development 
policy, sociocultural systems, and private-sector strategy. 
 
Kim's analysis of the accelerated learning process in the Korean semi-conductor 
industry is a particularly impressive example of the kind of insight to be gained from 
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multi-level, interdisciplinary research on innovation of the type being advocated here.  It 
demonstrates most forcefully how innovative capability at national, sectoral and firms 
levels can be developed and transformed in an interactive, non-linear, way over time. 
 
There are as yet few definitive methodological templates for carrying out such 
research.  One that has already demonstrated potential is the contextualist approach of 
Pettigrew (1985, 1990) which has been used by him in the study of strategic change.  
This approach is based on a number of broad principles which can be roughly distilled 
as follows: 
 
 (i)  It involves multiple levels of analysis in connecting context, process and 
  outcome using economic, political and cultural modes of inquiry; 
 
 (ii) Its perspective on social interaction in context is neither over-voluntarist 
nor over-deterministic in world view, but closer in orientation to the 
'ensemble des jeux' perspective on actors and systems reflected in the 
work of Crozier and Friedberg (1980); 
 
 (iii) It is primarily inductive in orientation and employs intensive longitudinal 
comparative research strategies that allow patterns of process to unfold 
and reveal themselves over time.   
 
This kind of meta-framework can provide welcome guidance to future researchers 
contemplating the multi-level study of innovation.  However, it is not a detailed 
specification, which perhaps remains its major strength.  It allows plenty of scope for 
originality on the part of the individual researcher in both the choice of substantive 
problem and the specifics of the research design.  Multi-level research on innovation is 
therefore likely to remain exploratory in both substance and method for some time to 
come.   
 
CONCLUSION 
The multi-disciplinary aspects of this paper have followed in the first instance from the 
fact that the authors are management and economics academics respectively.  
However, the examination of the way in which the two literatures have approached 
innovation in recent years shows that not only does each draw on the other, but they 
also both draw on a number of other disciplines such as psychology, sociology and 
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political science.  Whether because of this interactive learning in practice, or because 
of some more fundamental determinants, the approaches to innovation appear to be 
remarkably similar, irrespective of discipline.  The language, techniques and focus 
might differ slightly, but the basic arguments are the same: attempting to understand 
innovation as a simple, linear process, whether within the firm or, through diffusion, 
between firms, results in a truncated picture at best.  Innovation is complex, dynamic, 
spatially and historically diverse.   
 
This brings us to the multi-level or multi-layered aspect of this work.  At whatever level 
the focus, the argument that follows from our examination of the literature is that 
innovation is a consequence of processes operating at a number of different levels.  
Thus even if we focus on an individual innovator, the social, cultural and educational 
background of that individual may be important.  Whether his or her innovations are 
accepted and diffused will depend on the nature of the production system - including 
the organisation of the individual’s firm and inter-firm interactions of all kinds - as well 
as on the institutional set-up of the economy.   
 
Why have the approaches to innovation of both management and economics moved 
towards an acceptance of  a complex, multi-layered process?  First, there is a growing 
awareness in both disciplines of the possibilities of cross-fertilisation.  Rumelt, 
Schendel and Teece (1991), for example, show a whole range of cross-overs between 
strategic management and economics.  Second, at the forefront of both disciplines are 
moves away from the traditional, Newtonian approaches.  In management, for 
example, there is an increasing acceptance of limits to the role of the manager as firms 
become less hierarchical, more porous, more disaggregated.  In economics, 
particularly in the study of innovation, there is less reliance on the use of mathematics 
in deductive theorising, and more emphasis on ex-post analysis of more disparate 
actors and behaviours.  Elements of both disciplines seem to be entering the post-
modern world in which the assumptions of order and progress are called into question, 
in which there is a break-down of much accepted wisdom and a break-up of many 
organisational forms. 
 
On the other hand, these developments in the management and economic theories of 
innovation can be seen as responses to the empirical reality of tensions between 
globalisation, innovations, new forms of work organisation, and the increasing 
importance of competitiveness to firms, regions and economies.  The notion that 
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theoretical developments are, even in part, responses to changing empirical reality is 
anything but post-modern (Jameson, 1991).  In this paper we have identified a 
response on the part of academics in both management and economics to the 
increasing complexity, and have suggested ways of proceeding along this path. 
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